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The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation launched the Medicare Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement–Advanced (BPCI-A) program for hospitals in October 2018. Information is needed about the effects of the program on health care
utilization and Medicare payments.
METHODS

We conducted a modified segmented regression analysis using Medicare claims
and including patients with discharge dates from January 2017 through September
2019 to assess differences between BPCI-A participants and two control groups:
hospitals that never joined the BPCI-A program (nonjoining hospitals) and hospitals that joined the BPCI-A program in January 2020, after the conclusion of the
intervention period (late-joining hospitals). The primary outcomes were the differences in changes in quarterly trends in 90-day per-episode Medicare payments and
the percentage of patients with readmission within 90 days after discharge. Secondary outcomes were mortality, volume, and case mix.
RESULTS

A total of 826 BPCI-A participant hospitals were compared with 2016 nonjoining
hospitals and 334 late-joining hospitals. Among BPCI-A hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day per-episode Medicare payment was $27,315; the change in the quarterly trends in the intervention period as compared with baseline was −$78 per
quarter. Among nonjoining hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day per-episode Medicare payment was $25,994; the change in quarterly trends as compared with baseline was −$26 per quarter (difference between nonjoining hospitals and BPCI-A
hospitals, $52 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 34 to 70] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.2%
of the baseline payment). Among late-joining hospitals, the mean baseline 90-day
per-episode Medicare payment was $26,807; the change in the quarterly trends as
compared with baseline was $4 per quarter (difference between late-joining hospitals and BPCI-A hospitals, $82 [95% CI, 41 to 122] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.3% of
the baseline payment). There were no meaningful differences in the changes with
regard to readmission, mortality, volume, or case mix.
CONCLUSIONS

The BPCI-A program was associated with small reductions in Medicare payments
among participating hospitals as compared with control hospitals. (Funded by the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.)
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T

he health care system in the United
Me thods
States is in the midst of a transformation
from paying for volume to paying for BPCI-A–Participating Hospitals and Controls
value. One key vehicle in this transformation is BPCI-A participation began on October 1, 2018;
alternative payment models. Generally, these we obtained a publicly available list of the parmodels incorporate capitation, shared savings, ticipating hospitals from the Centers for Medior episode-based payment along with financial care and Medicaid Services (CMS). Participating
incentives for high-quality care. The Medicare hospitals selected 1 or more conditions in which
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement– to participate from 29 inpatient and 3 outpatient
Advanced (BPCI-A) initiative, which was launched options; there was no maximum number a hosin October 2018, is a voluntary alternative pay- pital could select. We included all inpatient conment model in which hospitals or clinician ditions in this study.
groups elect to assume accountability for the
We then selected two control groups. The
total costs of care during a specified “episode,” first control group comprised eligible hospitals
which is anchored on a hospitalization or proce- that never elected to join BPCI-A (nonjoining
dure and extends for 90 days thereafter.1,2 Under hospitals). The second control group comprised
the BPCI-A program, participating hospitals are hospitals that joined BPCI-A in January 2020
paid fee-for-service rates, but payments are recon- (late-joining hospitals); these hospitals served as
ciled against targets on a quarterly basis. Target a useful control group because they joined after
prices are based on a model that includes his- the end of the intervention period, but given that
torical utilization, hospital type, regional aver- they eventually elected to join the program, were
ages, and other factors. Hospitals in which the likely to be more similar in unmeasured ways to
total allowed Medicare payments per episode are the early-joining hospitals than to nonjoining
below target prices receive a reconciliation pay- hospitals.
We linked participation data to the American
ment, whereas those in which the payments per
episode are higher than target prices must pay a Hospital Association (AHA) 2017 annual survey
to obtain information on hospital characteristics
reconciliation payment to Medicare.
The BPCI-A initiative builds on the modest and to the Area Health Resources File to obtain
success of its predecessor, the BPCI (Bundled Pay- information on market characteristics. Hospitals
ments for Care Improvement) program, which that did not match to AHA data were excluded
ran from 2013 through 2018. The BPCI-A initia- from the analyses. Market share was calculated
tive differs from the original BPCI program in a as the proportion of all admissions in a county
few important ways: cost targets are set differ- for the condition of interest to each hospital,
ently, derived from a model that includes hospi- and market competitiveness was calculated by
tal and patient characteristics and historical means of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (see
hospital costs and regional costs; the program is the Supplementary Appendix, available with the
simpler, offering only episodes of 90 days’ dura- full text of this article at NEJM.org).3 The study
tion (rather than 30, 60, or 90 days) and fewer was approved by the Office of Human Research
choices of conditions; and quality measures, Administration at the Harvard School of Public
most notably readmission rates, are built into Health.
the program.1 These quality measures are used
to adjust the reconciliation payments, such that Patient-Episode Identification
hospitals with perfect quality scores would earn We used Medicare inpatient files from January 1,
100% of their reconciliation payments, whereas 2017, to September 30, 2019, to identify index
hospitals with quality scores of zero would earn admissions for BPCI-A conditions. We included
only 90% of their reconciliation payments. In fee-for-service beneficiaries who had been conthis study, we evaluated the association between tinuously enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B
BPCI-A participation and changes in the total during their episode of care as well as during the
allowed Medicare payments, in readmission and year before, and we excluded beneficiaries who
mortality, and in volume and case mix.
were eligible for Medicare because of end-stage
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renal disease. At participating hospitals, we included patients from only the conditions selected
by the hospital. At control hospitals, we included
patients from all 29 BPCI conditions. Coexisting
conditions were quantified with the use of the
Medicare Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse
(CCW), which identifies 27 chronic conditions
from beneficiaries’ inpatient and outpatient
claims. (CCW scores range from 0 to 27, with
higher scores indicating more coexisting conditions.) According to CMS definitions, patient
episodes begin with the index admission and
extend through 90 days after discharge. Patients
who die during the index admission are not
considered to have initiated an episode, and
their data are not included in the program and
analysis.
Outcomes

Our primary outcomes were the differences between BPCI-A hospitals and control hospitals
with respect to changes in quarterly trends in
the standardized allowed Medicare payments
per patient episode and in the percentage of
patients with readmission within 90 days after
discharge (90-day readmission) from baseline to
the intervention period. Standardized payments
remove differences in payment that are based on
the Medicare wage index and other special payments. All Medicare payments across all care
settings (inpatient, outpatient, postacute, physician billing, and durable medical equipment)
were included. Total payments were Winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of national episode payments annually, in accordance with the
program specifications, and were adjusted for
inflation to prices in 2019.
Secondary outcomes included between-group
differences in the changes in quarterly trends in
individual components of payment, the number
of healthy days at home during a 90-day window, 30-day and 90-day mortality, and a composite of 90-day readmission and mortality.
Healthy days at home is a measure of the number of days during the 90-day window that a
patient is alive and at home (i.e., not in a hospital, emergency department, skilled nursing facility, or other postacute facility).4 We also examined a number of indicators of case mix, including
age, sex, disability, race or ethnic group, mean
number of CCW coexisting conditions, the diag-
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nosis-related–group (DRG) complexity (the proportion of patients at each complexity level
within a given DRG, such as heart failure), and
the percentage of patients with outlier payments, which is a marker for very high clinical
complexity or unexpected complications.
Statistical Analysis

We compared the group of BPCI-A–participating
hospitals with two control groups (nonjoining
hospitals and late-joining hospitals) with respect
to hospital and market characteristics. Full details are provided in the Supplementary Appendix, but in brief, we used a modified segmented
regression approach to examine the difference
in quarterly trend for each outcome from baseline to the intervention period. We then compared those changes between BPCI-A hospitals
and nonjoining hospitals and between BPCI-A
hospitals and late-joining hospitals. For payments,
we calculated the percentage change by dividing
the difference in quarterly trends by the baseline
payment. Cost and clinical-outcome analyses
were run at the patient-episode level, with each
outcome in a separate model. For each outcome,
our primary analyses included all 29 conditions
as a group, but we also examined the 10 most
prevalent conditions individually.
In each model, time 0 was set as program
initiation. The time 1 variable was an indicator
for quarter, from −6 to 4 (i.e., the 6 quarters
before the intervention and the 4 quarters after).
The time 2 variable was set to zero until October
2018 and thereafter was set from 1 to 4. Interaction terms between time 1 and nonjoining hospitals, and between time 1 and late-joining
hospitals, allowed for different quarterly trends
in the three groups in the preintervention period.
The effect of the intervention was captured by
interaction terms between time 2 and nonjoining hospitals and between time 2 and late-joining
hospitals; significance determined whether there
had been a greater change in any outcome in
episodes at BPCI-A hospitals than at either group
of control hospitals. A marginal, generalized
estimating equation approach to modeling (the
GENMOD procedure in the SAS statistical package) was used to allow for correlation over time
within hospitals. We included indicator variables
for month, DRG (which indicates the condition as
well as its relative complexity), individual patient–
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level CCW coexisting conditions, and hospital
characteristics such as ownership, teaching status, rural location, and region. We conducted
sensitivity analyses with alternative measure specifications such as modeling payments with a log
link and gamma distribution rather than the CMS
method of a linear approach, including a random effect for hospital, and comparing BPCI-A
hospitals with hospitals in each control group
individually rather than comparing one model
with both control groups.
For the primary outcomes of our study, the
difference in change in trend in total Medicare
payments per episode and 90-day readmissions
among participating hospitals as compared with
nonjoining and late-joining hospitals, a P value
of 0.0125 (i.e., 0.05 ÷ 4) was considered to indicate
statistical significance. Secondary end points and
analyses should be considered exploratory, and
the 95% confidence intervals are not adjusted
for multiplicity.

R e sult s
Hospital and Market Characteristics

In total, 832 hospitals joined BPCI-A in October
2018. Congestive heart failure was the most
commonly chosen condition, selected by 508
BPCI-A hospitals, followed by sepsis, cardiac
arrhythmia, pneumonia, and acute myocardial
infarction (Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix).
The characteristics of the hospitals and of the
patients with episodes are shown in Table 1 (for
the analysis sample of hospitals with AHA descriptive information) and Table S2. Six of the
832 BPCI-A hospitals, 6 of the 340 late-joining
hospitals, and 182 of the 2198 nonjoining hospitals, which together comprised 81,246 of
7,614,297 patient episodes (1.1%), did not match
to AHA data and were excluded from the analyses (Fig. S1). Hospitals that participated in the
BPCI-A program were larger, were more often
for-profit in ownership, were more often teaching hospitals, were less often rural, and were
slightly differently distributed in terms of region
than either the late-joining or nonjoining hospitals, although differences between the BPCI-A
hospitals and the late-joining hospitals were
generally smaller in magnitude than those between the BPCI-A hospitals and the nonjoining

n engl j med 385;7

hospitals. The patient populations were wellmatched among the groups.
Medicare Payments over Time

Unadjusted total Medicare payments according
to study group over time are shown in Figure 1.
Formal testing compared the changes from baseline to the intervention period in the adjusted
quarterly trends in Medicare payments between
the intervention group and each control group
(Table 2). Among the BPCI-A hospitals, the mean
baseline payment was $27,315; the change in
quarterly trend in the intervention period as
compared with baseline was −$78 per quarter.
Among the nonjoining hospitals, the mean baseline payment was $25,994; the change in quarterly trend was −$26 per quarter. The difference
between nonjoining hospitals and BPCI-A hospitals in the changes in quarterly trends was significant (difference, $52 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 34 to 70] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.2% of
the baseline payment). Of this difference, 46.2%
($24 of $52) was related to payments to skilled
nursing facilities. Because our models assumed
a linear change during participation, the $52 in
savings per patient per quarter at BPCI-A hospitals, as compared with nonjoining hospitals,
would be projected to grow to $208 (95% CI, 136
to 280) by the fourth quarter of participation
(0.8% of the baseline payment).
Among the late-joining hospitals, the mean
baseline payment was $26,807; the change in
quarterly trend was $4 per quarter. The difference between late-joining hospitals and BPCI-A
hospitals was significant (difference, $82 [95%
CI, 41 to 122] per quarter; P<0.001; 0.3% of the
baseline payment). Of this difference, 65.9%
($54 of $82) was related to payments to skilled
nursing facilities (Table 2). The $82 in savings
per patient per quarter at BPCI-A hospitals, as
compared with late-joining hospitals, would be
projected to grow to $328 (95% CI, 166 to 488)
per patient by the fourth quarter (1.2% of the
baseline payment).
Findings were similar when we ran our models with alternative specifications, including when
we used a log link with a gamma distribution,
added hospital random effects, and ran separate
models for each comparison group (Tables S3
and S4). In individual analyses that were focused
on the 10 most commonly selected conditions,
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Hospitals and Patients at Baseline.*
Characteristic

BPCI-A Hospitals
(N = 826)

Late-Joining Hospitals
(N = 334)

Value

Value

6.7

3.1

Nonjoining Hospitals
(N = 2016)

Standardized
Mean Difference

Value

Standardized
Mean Difference

0.76

NA

NA

Hospitals
No. of conditions joined†
Ownership (%)
For profit

27.3

21.8

0.13

22.4

0.12

Not for profit

68.6

69.3

0.01

58.1

0.22

4.1

9.0

0.21

19.6

0.43

Public
Size (%)‡
Small

11.5

20.7

0.26

44.0

0.71

Medium

66.9

60.2

0.14

45.4

0.44

Large

21.4

18.0

0.08

10.6

0.32

Teaching (%)
Major teaching hospital

11.5

5.3

0.21

6.1

0.21

Minor teaching hospital

36.1

32.7

0.07

22.4

0.32

Nonteaching hospital

52.1

60.8

0.17

71.5

0.42

1.5

2.4

0.06

12.3

0.37

Rural location§
Patients
No. of patients across study
period (% of total)
No. of patients per quarter per
condition

1,633,448
(21.5)
27.0

288,288
(3.8)
26.0

5,692,561
(74.7)
−0.03

14.6

0.52

Age (%)
<65 yr

11.1

12.5

0.05

12.0

0.03

65–80 yr

46.2

46.3

<0.01

49.0

0.06

≥80 yr
Female sex (%)

42.7

41.1

−0.03

38.9

0.08

56.1

55.3

−0.02

56.1

<0.01

Enrolled in Medicaid (%)

28.0

29.5

0.03

27.9

<0.01

Qualified for Medicare on the
basis of disability (%)¶

24.3

27.3

0.07

26.1

0.04

White

79.4

81.6

0.05

83.0

0.09

Black

10.0

10.0

<0.01

8.9

0.04

6.5

4.7

−0.07

4.5

0.09

Race or ethnic group (%)‖

Hispanic
Other

4.1

3.8

−0.02

3.7

0.02

CCW score**

6.3

6.2

−0.04

5.8

0.14

48.2

53.3

0.10

41.2

0.14

1.5

1.6

<0.01

6.0

0.21

Percent of patients in the highestcomplexity DRG††
Percent of patients with outlier
payments‡‡
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Table 1. (Continued.)
*	Late-joining hospitals were those that joined the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement–Advanced (BPCI-A) program in
January 2020, after the intervention period of the study ended. Nonjoining hospitals were those that never joined the BPCI-A program.
Each control group (late-joining hospitals and nonjoining hospitals) was compared with the group of hospitals participating in the BPCI-A
program. The standardized mean difference is the difference in the mean values between the two groups, divided by the pooled standard
deviation of the two groups. The characteristics of the patients were calculated at the patient-episode level and are shown for all episodes
across the study period. Patients could appear in the sample more than once if their episodes were at least 90 days apart. Percentages
may not total 100 because of rounding. NA denotes not applicable.
†	Participating hospitals (BPCI-A hospitals and late-joining hospitals) selected 1 or more conditions in which to participate from 29 inpatient and 3 outpatient options; there was no maximum number of conditions that a hospital could select.
‡	Small hospitals were defined as those with fewer than 200 beds, medium as those with 200 to 400 beds, and large as those with more
than 400 beds.
§	Rural location was defined as counties with neither a metropolitan nor micropolitan designation.
¶	Whether the patient initially qualified for Medicare on the basis of disability is a variable that is provided in the Medicare enrollment data.
‖	Information on race and ethnic group was obtained from Medicare enrollment data.
**	The Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse (CCW) score indicates the number of major coexisting chronic conditions (out of 27).
††	The diagnosis-related group (DRG) indicates both the clinical condition and degree of complexity (e.g., heart failure with major complications or coexisting conditions, heart failure with complications or coexisting conditions, and heart failure without complications or coexisting conditions).
‡‡	Outlier payments constitute a marker of very high DRG complexity or unexpected complications.

A BPCI-A Hospitals vs. Nonjoining Hospitals

B BPCI-A Hospitals vs. Late-Joining Hospitals
BPCI-A
hospitals

25,000
Nonjoining
hospitals

20,000
15,000
10,000

BPCI-A program
begins

5,000
0

25,000

2018

Late-joining
hospitals

20,000
15,000
10,000

BPCI-A program
begins

5,000
0

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

2017

BPCI-A
hospitals

30,000

Total Unadjusted Medicare Payments
(U.S. dollars)

Total Unadjusted Medicare Payments
(U.S. dollars)

30,000

2019

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

2017

2018

2019

Figure 1. Unadjusted Total Medicare Payments According to Quarter among BPCI-A Hospitals, Nonjoining Hospitals, and Late-Joining
Hospitals.
Medicare claims were used to identify patients with Bundled Payments for Care Improvement–Advanced (BPCI-A) conditions at par
ticipating hospitals and at control hospitals, with discharge dates from January 1, 2017, to September 30, 2019. There were two control
groups: nonjoining hospitals, which never joined the BPCI-A program; and late-joining hospitals, which joined BPCI-A in January 2020,
after the intervention period ended. The mean payments are shown.

the patterns were directionally similar for 7 of
the 10 comparisons with the nonjoining hospitals and for 9 of the 10 comparisons with the
late-joining hospitals, although many 95% confidence intervals crossed zero (Table S5).

n engl j med 385;7

Changes in Other Outcomes

The unadjusted 90-day readmission rates according to study group over time are shown in Figure
S2. There were no meaningful differences in the
changes in trends in 30-day or 90-day readmis-
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Table 2. Changes in Trends in Medicare Payments per Episode, Overall and According to Care Setting.*
Outcome and Group

Baseline
Payment

Quarterly Trend
Baseline

Change in
Trend

Difference in
Change (95% CI)

P Value

Intervention
U.S. dollars

Total 90-day Medicare payment
BPCI-A hospitals

27,315

−68

−146

−78

—

Nonjoining hospitals
Late-joining hospitals

25,994

−94

−120

−26

52 (34 to 70)

<0.001

26,807

−144

−140

4

82 (41 to 122)

<0.001

9,599

−41

−45

−4

—

Nonjoining hospitals

10,163

−48

−45

3

7 (3 to 11)

Late-joining hospitals

9,409

−21

−20

2

6 (−1 to 12)

BPCI-A hospitals

5,640

−52

−77

−24

—

Nonjoining hospitals

5,163

−44

−45

−1

24 (14 to 33)

Late-joining hospitals

5,571

−97

−68

29

54 (33 to 74)

BPCI-A hospitals

4,472

16

1

−15

Nonjoining hospitals

3,923

0

−4

−4

11 (3 to 19)

Late-joining hospitals

4,466

−17

−17

0

15 (−4 to 34)

BPCI-A hospitals

428

−19

−15

4

Nonjoining hospitals

282

−15

−12

3

−2 (−6 to 3)

Late-joining hospitals

386

−16

−13

3

−1 (−13 to 10)

BPCI-A hospitals

716

8

−1

−9

—

Nonjoining hospitals

642

2

−1

−3

7 (3 to 11)

Late-joining hospitals

629

4

−2

−6

3 (−6 to 13)

BPCI-A hospitals

1,251

0

−6

−6

—

Nonjoining hospitals

1,130

−3

−9

−6

0 (−2 to 2)

Late-joining hospitals

1,124

4

−3

−7

−2 (−5 to 2)

BPCI-A hospitals

44

1

0

0

Nonjoining hospitals

45

0

0

0

0 (0 to 0)

Late-joining hospitals

38

0

0

0

0 (0 to 1)

Index hospitalization
BPCI-A hospitals

Skilled nursing facility

Readmission
—

Long-term care hospital
—

Inpatient rehabilitation facility

Home health care

Durable medical equipment
—

*	Baseline data represent the raw mean from the first quarter of the study period. A positive difference in change indicates that participation
in the BPCI-A program was associated with a reduction in payments as compared with the indicated group. Differences may not calculate as
expected because of rounding. CI denotes confidence interval.

sion rates or mortality, or in the composite of hospitals (Table 3). However, our analyses sug90-day readmission and mortality, between BPCI-A gested that patients at BPCI-A hospitals gained
hospitals and either the nonjoining or late-joining more healthy days at home (0.06 days per quar-
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Table 3. Changes in Trends in Clinical Outcomes.*

Outcome and Group

Baseline Value

Relative Quarterly Change

Ratio of
Relative Changes

Ratio of Ratios of
Relative Changes
(95% CI)

—

Baseline

Intervention

1.003

1.001

0.998

P Value

90-Day readmission (%)
BPCI-A hospitals

30.5

Nonjoining hospitals

27.8

1.000

0.999

0.999

1.001 (1.000 to 1.003)

0.14

Late-joining hospitals

31.3

0.995

0.996

1.001

1.004 (1.000 to 1.008)

0.08

BPCI-A hospitals

16.9

1.003

1.002

0.998

—

Nonjoining hospitals

15.4

1.000

1.000

0.999

1.001 (0.999 to 1.003)

Late-joining hospitals

17.2

0.995

0.997

1.001

1.003 (0.998 to 1.008)

BPCI-A hospitals

13.1

0.992

0.994

1.002

—

Nonjoining hospitals

11.4

0.994

0.995

1.001

1.000 (0.997 to 1.003)

Late-joining hospitals

14.3

1.000

1.000

1.001

0.999 (0.993 to 1.005)

BPCI-A hospitals

6.6

0.988

0.992

1.004

—

Nonjoining hospitals

5.6

0.992

0.993

1.001

0.998 (0.994 to 1.002)

Late-joining hospitals

7.5

1.004

1.002

0.998

0.995 (0.987 to 1.003)

30-Day readmission (%)

90-Day mortality (%)

30-Day mortality (%)

90-Day readmission or
mortality (%)
BPCI-A hospitals

38.1

1.000

0.999

0.999

—

Nonjoining hospitals

34.3

0.998

0.998

1.000

1.001 (0.999 to 1.002)

Late-joining hospitals

40.0

0.996

0.998

1.001

1.002 (0.999 to 1.006)

BPCI-A hospitals

22.1

0.999

0.999

1.000

—

Nonjoining hospitals

19.7

0.998

0.998

1.000

1.000 (0.998 to 1.002)

Late-joining hospitals

23.3

0.997

0.998

1.001

1.001 (0.996 to 1.005)

30-Day readmission or
mortality (%)

No. of healthy days at home,
out of 90 days†
BPCI-A hospitals

69.5

0.12

0.18

0.06

—

Nonjoining hospitals

71.7

0.10

0.12

0.02

−0.04 (−0.06 to −0.01)

Late-joining hospitals

68.7

0.17

0.14

−0.03

−0.08 (−0.13 to −0.03)

*	Baseline data represent the raw mean from the first quarter of the study period. A ratio greater than 1 indicates that BPCI-A participation
was associated with reductions in the outcomes as compared with the indicated group. Ratios are based on unrounded data.
†	For this outcome, the baseline and intervention values reflect quarterly trends, and the differences between groups are presented in days. A
negative difference indicates that BPCI-A participation was associated with a greater gain in healthy days at home than the indicated group.

ter) than did patients at nonjoining hospitals
(0.02 days per quarter; difference, −0.04 days;
95% CI, −0.06 to −0.01) or at late-joining hospitals (−0.03 days per quarter; difference, −0.08
days; 95% CI, −0.13 to −0.03). There were no

n engl j med 385;7

meaningful differences in the changes in trends
between BPCI-A hospitals and nonjoining or latejoining hospitals in the quarterly volume or
measures of patient selection and case mix, including age, sex, disability, race and ethnic
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The

n e w e ng l a n d j o u r na l

of

m e dic i n e

group, mean number of coexisting conditions, were not associated with higher readmission
DRG complexity, and the percentage of patients rates, which is one measure of poorly coordiwith outlier payments (Table S6).
nated postdischarge care. It is also reassuring
that we did not find evidence that hospitals responded to participation in the BPCI-A program
Discussion
by reducing the proportion of their patients who
We found that BPCI-A participation was associ- were older or had more medically complex conated with small, favorable changes in Medicare ditions or by increasing volume.
payments when compared with either nonjoinThis study should be interpreted in the coning hospitals (i.e., hospitals that at no point text of other studies in this field. Whereas a
joined the BPCI-A program) or late-joining hos- growing body of research has examined the
pitals (i.e., hospitals that joined the BPCI-A pro- original BPCI program, showing evidence of
gram after the intervention period in the current success with regard to major joint replacestudy). BPCI-A hospitals had small improvements ment,5,10 late but not early success with regard to
in cost trends, which were driven by reductions medical conditions,7,8,11 and no evidence that
in spending by skilled nursing facilities; this hospitals preferentially shifted their case mix
finding is consistent with previous results in the away from higher-risk patients and toward loweroriginal BPCI program.5,6 In contrast to results risk patients (termed “adverse selection”),12,13
in the original BPCI program,7,8 our finding that previous studies of the BPCI-A program have
changes in spending emerged within the first focused on participation rather than perforyear is notable. It is possible that hospitals join- mance.2,14,15
ing the BPCI-A program had better knowledge
There are limitations to our findings. Most
about condition-specific best practices that could important, the BPCI-A program is voluntary.
be implemented to reduce spending than did There is selection with regard to which hospitals
hospitals in the original BPCI experiment. In join the program, and among the participating
addition, a majority of hospitals joined in part- hospitals, there is selection in terms of which
nership with a third-party bundled-payment con- conditions the hospitals elect to join. We atvening organization; such organizations typi- tempted to address selection in enrollment by
cally provide infrastructure, data analysis, and controlling for a number of hospital characterisstrategic direction and thus may have sped the tics and also by including a second control
diffusion of knowledge across participating in- group that consisted of late-joining hospitals,
stitutions.
which are probably more similar to the earlyWe did not compare hospital spending with joining hospitals than to the nonjoining hospitarget prices of the Center for Medicare and tals in both measurable and unmeasurable charMedicaid Innovation (CMMI), because neither acteristics. We were unable to address selection
the prices nor the methods that have been used with regard to which conditions the hospitals
to calculate the targets have been released. Our elected to join, and we were unable to account
findings reflect changes in the unique cost for whether hospitals changed their behavior in
curves of hospitals rather than in changes in anticipation of joining. All the hospitals in our
spending relative to a calculated target. CMMI has sample were also subject to participation in
publicly stated that its target prices were proba- mandatory value-based payment programs that
bly too high and thus that more hospitals than would have probably dissuaded them from artianticipated met the spending targets.9 Medicare ficially inflating their own costs, and it seems
has announced that it will recalculate target unlikely that hospitals would have asked postprices for future years of the program, but details acute facilities to increase their costs, but we
cannot rule out this possibility. Our estimates
of these calculations have not been released.
We did not find evidence of negative effects therefore probably represent a best-case scenario
in terms of clinical outcomes or patient selec- for the effect of bundled payments, and our
tion, but our measures were relatively blunt. findings should not be assumed to generalize
Nonetheless, it is reassuring that reductions in beyond the specific group of hospitals and conspending for postacute care and total spending ditions we studied.
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Year 1 of BPCI-A Model

Our analyses are based on claims data and
depend on accurate coding practices, which
could vary according to hospital or over time,
and do not contain important information related to functional status or interpersonal aspects of care. We did not assess performance on
quality measures that are included in the program, other than readmission, because they do
not apply to all conditions, for the most part
they cannot be calculated from claims data, and
data on measures not related to claims are available from Medicare only on the basis of a 2-to3-year rolling average, with the most recent
performance including data from the periods of
2016–2018 or 2017–2019, depending on the measure.16 The BPCI-A program is new, and we had
a limited follow-up period; longer-term followup may be necessary for a full evaluation of how
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